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South Africa has long dominated its neighbours. As the essays in this issue chart, the
post-apartheid epoch has certainly not brought about the withering away of the power
of South African firms or the South African state. Indeed this project makes a major
contribution to the study of both South Africa and the region by providing, for the first
time, close and careful studies of how new relationships have been formed as South
African firms have expanded across the region and continent. This work thus begins to
provide what none of the studies in the last quarter century have: the material to build
up, from concrete studies of South African capital and local actors, the regional and
incipient continental network centred on SouthAfrica.
How these relationships coalesce and where they are heading remains very much
an open question. It is easy to make imprudent projections of the South African-
African relationship. Over fifteen years ago, as part of a project involving a group at
Binghamton University and a group at the Centro de Estudos Africanos at Eduardo
Mondlane, I worked on an assessment of the future of southern Africa with the
expected passing of the coercive relationships constructed under the apartheid regime
(Wallerstein, Vieira, Martin 1992). At the time I and others (Martin 1991, Davies and
Martin 1992,) laid out three plausible scenarios. The first marked out a potential path of
regional restabilisation, complete with ties of uneven development, accompanied by
falling contract labour migration but enhanced South African capital expansion. The
second scenario suggested a break-up of the region as individual states re-oriented to
the North under conditions of structural adjustment.Athird alternative entailed the de-
centring of South Africa with continuing, and potentially more rewarding, regional
relationships.
While some projections were prescient – including continuing uneven
development and a rise in conflict and xenophobia over migrant flows in the absence of
apartheid boundaries – hindsight suggests we proceeded with two unqualified
assumptions: One, we placed too much emphasis on and faith in the decisions of states
inherited by national liberation and mass democratic movements, and two, we
assumed stability in North-South relations. These were not unreasonable assumptions;
they are still shared by many today. Past scholar activists now serving the ANC
government as well as those opposing it share, for example, a heavy focus upon state
action andAfrica’s location along a fixed, North-South axis.
Looking forward, however, these assumptions seriously misled us. For what was
unforeseeable in the 1980s and even 1990s is now, I would argue, not only discernible
but quite critical to build into our analyses: a radical shift in the world economic and
political order. I am referring here to any generalized ‘globalization’ or ‘empire’
phenomena, but rather two quite concrete transitions: (1) the rise of East-South
not
relationships over North-South ones, and more specifically the demise of Europe’s and
North America’s dominion over Africa, and (2), due to growing resistance, the end of
the neoliberal Thermidor and the emerging search for a stable, post-liberal, social
world.
These twin processes will shake and remake imperial networks across Africa,
including South Africa’s pivotal position. Yet there is little sign that either the South
African state or South African capital, focused as they are on short-term calculations
and policies, recognize the depth and implications of these ongoing transformations.
Both remain dedicated to the continuation of the apartheid regime’s commitment to
Europe and North America, and in particular the policies and practices of
neoliberalism. This posture stands in sharp contrast to the stance of similarly-situated
Asian and Latin American states, and promises over the long-run to considerably
undermine SouthAfrica’s dominant position in the region and the continent.
South Africa’s pivotal role as an intervening node on North-South relationships – as
indicated by the unwieldy concepts of a ‘sub-imperial’ or more precisely ‘semi-
peripheral’ position in the world-economy – was constructed through conscious state
action in the interwar period. It was in this chaotic period that South Africa emerged as
an industrializing and polarizing centre by diverting trade, investment, and political
flows that had previously run directly along bilateral, North-South lines. Creating
centre-hinterland ties across southern Africa was very much a South African state-led
endeavour against open, underdeveloping ties to the regional colonizer Britain on the
one hand, and the countervailing creation of underdeveloping relationships with
surrounding colonial territories on the other hand (Martin 1990a, 1990b). Only South
Africa’s singular status as an independent white state, operating amidst a world
depression and the sharp demise of Britain, made this possible.Apartheid, the post-war
economic boom, and an open alliance with the US-led world order supported (but did
not advance) this new region through the last half of the twentieth century.
This world order and the complacencies it has sustained were shaken apart in the
last quarter of the twentieth century. Over twenty-five years of structural adjustment,
the collapse of US hegemony, and attacks on the developmental state across Africa
have shattered the legitimacy and structural pillars of the post-war liberal order. As the
Afro-pessimists keep reminding us, there doesn’t seem to be much place for Africa in
today’s chaotic world-economy beyond a supplier of primary products. Fifteen years
ago policymakers talked ofAfrica ‘falling off the policy map’ and the disappearance of
any development, much less industrialization, agenda. Today the discussion of Africa
in Europe and the US, particularly in business and foreign policy circles, is largely
circumscribed around oil and raw materials, terrorist havens, and celebrity and charity
aid most often targeted at quelling, in the words of Western analysts, the continent's
‘tribal’, ‘fundamentalist’, and ‘genocidal’ wars.
What startled and unnerved Northern business and government observers is the
unheralded arrival of a new challenger to European and US domination of the
continent: EastAsia.As the opening pages of the World Bank’s 2007 study on
put it,




Since 2000 there has been a massive increase in trade and investment flows between [sub-Saharan]
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Africa andAsia. Today,Asia receives about 27 percent ofAfrica’s exports, in contrast to only about
14 percent in 2000. This volume of trade is now almost on par with Africa’s exports to the United
States and the European Union (EU) – Africa’s traditional trading partners; in fact, the EU’s share
ofAfrican exports has halved over the period 2000-05 (Broadman 2007: 2).
The World Bank exaggerates, as do the pages of the Northern press and policy journals
that are littered with a racially- and colonially-tinged discourse on China’s ‘African
Safari’, China’s role as ‘The New Colonialist’, or China’s ‘Scramble for Africa’ (for
example, 2006, 2008; Walt 2006). Data on the continent’s imports for the
last twenty-five years present a less dramatic picture, even taking into account the
recent commodity price increases (see Martin 2008: 365): trade with Europe and the
US has been declining for over a generation and still outweighs East Asia’s share. The
long-term trend is nevertheless evident: the demise of the centrality of Europe and,
except for oil, the United States (Klare and Volman, 2006).
What has changed is the nature of Africa’s external trade: Africa with few
exceptions continues to produce what it cannot consume and consumes what it does
not produce. Indeed measures of export diversification record over a fifty percent
for the continent in the midst of the current commodity price bubble (African
Development Bank and OECD 2008: 658). Exports to Asia replicate Africa’s
relationship with the North: they are predominantly composed of primary products,
from oil, to minerals, to cotton. Africa’s imports from Asia follow a similar pattern,
being composed primarily of light industrial products and rising from very low figures
in the 1980s to actually surpassing imports from the US and approaching import values
with Europe (Martin 2008: 365).
Asia is also much more important as a trading partner for Africa than Africa is for
Asia. While China, India and Asia as a whole are beginning to dominate Africa’s
imports and exports, Africa in 2005 took only 2.5 percent of China’s exports and less
than 2 percent of Asia’s exports, and represented but 3.4 percent of China’s imports
and less than 2 percent ofAsia’s imports. Nor is this figure increasing: the share of both
imports and exports is less than it was in 1980, with the export share falling by over half
(calculated from IMF 2007). This reveals a pattern of unequal exchange and power,
common for so long with Europe and NorthAmerica.
Investment flows are lower and harder to track over time (for example, Broadman,
2007, 86-94, 289-304). They are however rapidly increasing from a very low base. By
2006 Chinese investment in Africa had risen to approximately $12 billion by some
estimates, as compared to bilateral trade of $56 billion; Indian investment adds another
$7 billion (Bajpaee 2008). Most visible are projects in resource-rich states by Chinese
firms, with over 800 Chinese state firms estimated to be operating in China. In the
Sudan, for example, the state-run oil company PetroChina is the second-biggest
shareholder, after Malaysia’s Petronas, in the Sudanese oil-consortium Petrodar; the
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has been made billion-dollar
investments in Nigeria; and Beijing has loaned over $2 billion toAngola.
Expansion extends beyond resource extraction and loans to infrastructure and
construction as well. In late 2007 it was announced for example that China would
rebuild Congolese railways, mines, and roads at a cost of $12 billion in exchange for
the right to mine copper to that value. By some estimates Chinese firms are winning 50
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investments in the financial sector have also emerged, as in the late 2007, $5.5 billion
purchase by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China of a 20.5 per cent stake in
South Africa’s Standard Bank, and the China Development Bank’s partnership with
Nigeria’s United Bank forAfrica. The sight of Chinese businessmen, miners, labourers
and traders is now common across the continent; the Chinese state-run Xinhua News
Agency estimated last year that over 750,000 long-term Chinese migrants were living
inAfrica (Berger, 2007).
These relationships prefigure a significant shift away from the institutional
channels that have so securely tied Africa to the North. Africa's richer states now
bypass international financial institutions and northern banks, for example, and
arrange loans directly from China which allows them, as in the Angolan case, to avoid
the structural adjustment conditionalities imposed by western states and the IMF.
Asian multinationals and Chinese state firms similarly provide competitors for
western multinationals in the mining, oil, and even merchandise trade sectors.
There is a countervailing cost here however: despite Asia's and especially China’s
revolutionary history, it is clear that Africa’s new relationship with Asia and China in
particular has not benefited trade union or social justice movements. As African
activists and scholars have argued (Manji and Marks 2007, Rocha 2007, Riebeiro
2007,Askouri 2007), China is no better friend of local movements than western states,
with China supporting repressive regimes from the Sudan to Zimbabwe. Overall, the
practices of Chinese firms and state agencies have paid little heed to local demands for
human rights, labour union rights, transparency, or environmental protection. This has
fuelled local small businessmen’s and opposition leaders’ denunciation of Chinese
businesses in Lesotho and Zambia for example. Workers at Chinese firms have also
increasingly gone on strike against poor pay and working conditions, most notably at
the Chambisi mine in Zambia where after 49 workers died in 2005 due to unsafe
working conditions, riot police were called out to quell a 2005 strike.
Transnational movement linkages with China have proven very difficult to
construct. Such relationships have in other cases proven critical, as in African-
European movement collaboration in relation to the Sudan, the Niger Delta, or
Zimbabwe, or, closer to home, the coordinated blocking by African activists and trade
unions of the unloading of arms bound for Zimbabwe from the Chinese ship ‘An Yue
Jiang’. Such alliances have yet to be made with Chinese civic organizations or
movements, a process rendered very difficult indeed by the Chinese government's
controls over local civil society organizations, social movements, unions, and the
media.
By contrast to the rest of the continent, South Africa possesses industrial, commercial,
infrastructural and financial power. Yet South Africa has also witnessed a steady
reorientation from the North to the East as a number of early studies have suggested
(Taylor, 2007; Naidu, 2006, 2007). As figure 1 illustrates, South Africa's imports from
China over the 1998-2006 period more than doubled (from 4 percent to 11 percent),
and increased 50 percent from all of Asia to reach 30 percent of South Africa’s total
imports. Exports to Asia and China, comprised mainly of primary products (and more
recently machinery and transport equipment) more than doubled as figure two charts
SouthAfrica Faces East
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(from 14 to 30 percent for Asia and from less than 2 percent to over 5 percent for
China).
South African investment in China has also been growing from a very low base,
although we lack a comprehensive survey or data (see among others Broadman 2007;
Naidu, 2007: 470-73).
Where South Africa stands apart from other African states, of course, is that it has
long been situated at the heart of regional and increasingly continental networks. As
the case studies in this special issue document, these have expanded in recent years –
but not with such strong results as might have been expected prior to the fall of the
Figure 1: SouthAfrican Imports: Europe, US,Asia, China
Figure 2: SouthAfrican Exports: Europe, US,Asia, China
Source: IMF, 2007.
Source: IMF, 207.
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apartheid state. SouthAfrica’s imports fromAfrica over the period 1998-2006 doubled
from 2 to over 4 percent of total imports, but this has largely been due to increases from
oil producers Nigeria and Angola. Exports to Africa as a percentage of total exports
have barely changed since 1998 (at around 13-14 percent). Exports to SADC states
have actually to around 10 percent of South Africa’s total exports. As these
figures suggest, industrialized SouthAfrica faces potential competitive pressures from
the industrialized East that are unlike those ofAfrica’s primary producers.
Regional and continental investment and trade may be small proportion of total
South African ex/imports and investment, but these aggregates hide the fact that
African markets have long represented a significant market for South Africa’s more
advanced industrial, financial, commercial, and mining firms. For South Africa’s
manufacturers the SADC region is still key: it takes between 10 and 20 percent of
manufactured exports as Table 1 illustrates.
Other African states are rarely competitors here, but this is not the case for China and
India. As Europe and the United States de-industrialized, Asia and particularly China
have become, like South Africa, exporters of both low- and middle-range industrial
goods – and produce these goods with much larger and lower-cost labour reserves.
South African advantages in the mining and commercial fields may be more enduring
than in consumer manufactures, but are, in the long-run, equally vulnerable to
expandingAsian investment. Studies of LatinAmerica manufacturing in the face of the
Asian challenge are not reassuring: like South African manufacturers, Latin American
firms face higher labour costs while lacking Chinese firms’ access to low-cost human
capital and technology, generous government assistance, and a state able to constrain
labour and civil society demands (Moreira 2007).
The competitive pressures are no less present in relation to investment: Asia and
China in particular are the major destinations of global inward foreign direct
investment, and are also increasingly a source for outward foreign investment for the
South, including most notably Africa (Kaplinksy and Messner, 2008). China’s pursuit
of a level, ‘free trade’ playing field, shorn of European and US protectionism, can
nevertheless have real advantages for African producers of cotton, rice, groundnuts,
etc. Yet as has been seen in Lesotho and South Africa, manufacturers of clothing and
even processed food stuffs can easily be displaced as manufacturers (including Asian-
owned firms) shutter their doors and often move to China (Kaplinksy and Morris,
2008). Chinese competition in the construction field,Asian competition in retail trade,
and growing Asian financial and banking investments indicate the breadth of the
challenge for SouthAfrican firms.
declined
Table 1: SouthAfrican Manufactured Exports, 2005
(SITC) Manufactures Category SADC % of total
Chemicals 19.2 %
Manufactured Goods 5.1 %
Machines, Transport Equip. 12.0 %
ManufacturedArticles 17.1 %
Source: UN, 2007
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It thus bears stressing that the effect of the gravitational pull of East Asia is
qualitatively different for South Africa by comparison with almost all African states in
two fundamental ways. One, while South Africa like other states and regions is re-
orienting from North to East, this shifts not just primary-product export markets, but
poses a fundamental challenge to much more advanced industrial, financial and
commercial producers. Growing African ties with the East are likely to bypass or be at
the expense of South African capital. Second, these shifts can displace, as can already
be seen in the commercial, mining, and financial sectors, South Africa’s historically
privileged, and underdeveloping, ties with the region. It is thus not simply that the hold
of the North is declining as the East rises: it is clearly the case that the region as an
integrated social and economic formation may well break apart – at South Africa’s
expense.
Against these trends it is possible to hold out the possibility of a more
complementary relationship with East Asia and China in particular. The emergence of
an East Asian zone founded on dense networks circulating around China offers one
such hope, based as it is in China’s imports from neighbours of both primary products
sophisticated electronic components and capital goods. There is little evidence to
date however of such a relationship emerging between South African industrial
producers and China, notwithstanding several South African licensing and direct
investment deals in China. The contrast of Western capitalist development with an
ostensibly less or non-exploitative Asian pattern of development – as in Giovanni
Arrighi’s (2007) account of the Chinese path of ‘development without dispossession’
utilizing equitable links between the national economies of East Asia – offers yet
another prospect to consider. As with the hopeful projection of a ‘Bandung’ of
progressive Southern states and elites, there is little evidence to date, however, of such
even and mutually beneficial relations emerging on the basis of a radically new pattern
of national, regional, or transnational accumulation. Certainly increasing inequality
and social protest in China itself point toward quite different processes at work.
Caught between powers to the North and East, what might be the future of South
Africa’s historic subimperial role in the region? Taking into account the nature of local
elites’ and movements’ responses suggests three, long-term possibilities.
The first might be termed a ‘Washington-Pretoria Consensus’. This would be
defined by a continuation of South African regional hegemony, based on the historic
alliance with Europe and North America. This is the most plausible, short-term
projection. This neoliberal alliance between the North and African states and their
ruling elites has been forged over the course of the last generation, as structural
adjustment, privatisation, and export-oriented policies were adopted across the
continent in the 1980s. The emergence of an ANC government in the mid-1990s only
cohered this trend, as the South African state committed itself to neoliberal
orthodoxies. The benefits were to be two: development by invitation as a junior partner
of Europe and the US, and an open door to the region. This permitted, as Richard
Saunders (2008) and others (Games 2004) have documented, a surge of South African
investment in the region after 1997. African states’ privatisation of state enterprises
and
Regional Scenarios: Washington Consensus, Bandung Consensus, or Peoples’
Consensus?
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and the relaxation of controls on foreign investment proved particularly timely for
SouthAfrican expansionism.
The key forces militating against this scenario are quite straightforward. It assumes
above all a continuation of the power of the US, Europe, and international financial
institutions. As indicated by the fate of AGOA and trade with the EU on one hand, and
the competitive expansion of Chinese and Indian networks on the other, there are
strong forces pulling Africa states and markets away from the North and towards the
East. Neoliberal policies may have secured wider regional and continental operations
for South Africa, but they have also done so for China, India, and East Asia as a whole.
As Africa tilts East, South Africa may thus become increasingly isolated, a process
propelled by the South African government’s continuing commitment to a de-
legitimized relationship with Europe and the United States. For bothAfrican states and
movements – for very different reasons – South Africa may become a less and less
attractive partner. For movements, South African may easily come to represent an
intractable promoter of rigid neoliberal policies and autocratic governments, while for
individual states and their elites far more attractive opportunities may be offered by
Eastern (if not Northern) firms and states. The dilemmas, to put it mildly, of South
African leadership of the African Union, the African Parliament, and NEPAD
document these centrifugal forces very well. For many African elites and leaders from
Sudan in the North to Angola and Zimbabwe in the South, China offers an attractive
alternative. Under these conditions one could easily envisage a dissolution of the
region as we have known it.
These tendencies suggest a second, long-term alternative: a ‘New Bandung
Consensus’. This requires one to accept, which is all I can plausibly do here, that the
Washington Consensus is dying and the search is on for a new, social regulatory world
that can incorporate increasingly frustrated elites and unruly populations across the
South (see for example Porter and Craig, 2004, Cammack, 2004, Goldman 2005). The
indicators of this process are widespread, from the collapse of the Doha round of the
WTO and the IMF after the 1997 Asian crisis, to the remarkable election of populist
and even ‘anti-globalization’ governments, particularly in Latin America. Seen from
the Asian side of the Indian Ocean, such a prospect offers China and potentially India
the means to secure their geopolitical and geo-economic rivalry with the North through
an alliance with the Global South. State elites are key here, as they were with the
original Bandung: can such an alliance secure their position and minimal levels of
social peace and development?
The obstacles are legion. For South Africa, it is not too difficult to see a movement
toward such an alliance through the emergence of a more populist leadership less tied
to alliances with the North and more attentive to growing grassroots discontent.
Despite this, neoliberal policies may well continue, as they would benefit both Chinese
and South African businessmen. There are also clear advantages to the South African
state if it could secure a position as a leading power in this group – as has often been
raised in various discussions of a Brazil-Russia-India-China-South African axis in
representing the Global South in world trade fora. One doesn’t have be triumphalist
about the prospects for a new Bandung (see Palat 2008 for a negative assessment) to
perceive that China, India, Brazil, Venezuela, Russia, and Bolivia, among others, have
begun to lay the basis for a social and economic order beyond neoliberalism by
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implementing new social programmes and asserting control over natural resources.
For some this portends a new version of Polanyi’s analysis of the mid-twentieth
century counter-movement to free trade and the self-regulating market (Silver and
Arrighi 2003). Ideologically one might expect a considerable emphasis on Africa’s
and Asia’s shared history of suffering under European colonialism and neo-
colonialism.
Such a path would do little to lessen growing inequalities and indeed protest across
southern and continental Africa due to the deregulation of local markets, the
privatisation of state operations, and polarizing, uneven development. To the extent
that African as well as worldwide ‘anti-globalization’ movements accelerate, the
alliances underpinning scenarios one and two become increasingly fragile. Under
these conditions a more chaotic and even nationalist environment could witness the
break-up of the region and South Africa’s semi-peripheral role in relation to either the
North (scenario one) or the East (scenario two). This raises in turn the possibility of a
‘Peoples’ Consensus’, with the policies of state and regional organizations being
driven by increasingly unruly, popular discontent. Anti-capitalist and trans-nationally
linked movements – as can be seen in current land, anti-privatisation, AIDS, squatter,
and other movements in the region – could well accelerate their attack on neoliberal
and corrupt governments, opening up the possibility of not only alternative
developmental initiatives but also greater cooperation in confronting underdeveloping
and undemocratic forces from either the North or East. Today's Latin American
examples offer signs of such possibilities.
The forces pushing both this last scenario and the New Bandung Consensus
scenario raise the prospect of one last radical transformation: a significant disruption
of the racial hierarchies through which regional and global accumulation operates.
These have long been formed, even in their latest multicultural guise, around a white
North-black South continuum. The emergence of East-South hierarchies, explicitly
posed in opposition to past North/South colonial-racial relationships, disrupts this
essential feature of daily life and daily accumulation across the region and the
continent. South Africans are all too aware of this problem, despite a growing black
elite; appeals to class solidarity cannot obscure the continuing, lived experience of
racial and ethno-national hierarchies, including accelerating ethno-national and
xenophobic conflict. How past hierarchies, so essential to North/South inequalities,
will be recast as African-Asian relationships deepen and North/South ones recede is a
critical question that has hardly been posed. Unlike past African-Asian relations,
where both partners have shared a subordinate position within the North/South
colonial frame, global racial hierarchies will in the near future entail the inclusion of
risingAsia’s own racial constructions in relation to Europe and the US as well as within
Asia itself (Dikötter 1992, 1997; Dirlik 2008; Tanaka 1993).
Each of these scenarios offers a very different path for the states, firms, and peoples
of southernAfrica and indeed the continent. If SouthAfrican subimperialism was built
through alliances among white supremacist states and Euro-American capital, the
conditions to maintain such a system are, for the many reasons charted above, rapidly
disappearing As we look toward the future, the prospect of a very different regional,
continental, and world order is in front of us. The very uncertainty of what might
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emerge to replace today’s social and economic order, given the continuing social costs
of apartheid and neoliberalism, is, in itself, to be welcomed.
Comments by participants at the SAARI workshop, 4-7 July 2007, and in particular
suggestions by Darlene Miller, Ravi Palat, and Richard Saunders, were instrumental in
developing this essay and are gratefully acknowledged.
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